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Abstract
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental
three-player contests. We nd that players in endogenously formed alliances cope
better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an
alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending e¤ort above average choose
to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even
more, whereas their co-players choose lower e¤ort. Anticipation of this exploitation
may explain their preference to stand alone.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the determinants of group formation and its consequences for e¤orts
and success in a conict framework of competition between a group of players (an alliance)
and an opponent. Which characteristics determine whether a player enters into an alliance
or prefers to stand alone in an upcoming contest? How does the process of alliance formation
a¤ect contest behavior and what are the implications of alliance formation on the players
e¤ort contributions and payo¤s? Our paper provides answers to these questions and o¤ers
insights that are useful for the institutional design in situations where rewards are allocated
on the basis of relative performance.
For anecdotal evidence on possible answers to the questions outlined we can resort to
classic ction. In his dramaWilhelm Tell, Friedrich Schiller (1804) describes the formation of
an alliance as well as the conscious decision to abstain from joining an alliance, both for good
economic reasons. First, the drama features the famous "Rütli-Oath" in which three men
unite forces in an alliance to ght against tyranny. It refers to the legend according to which
three cantons formed a confederation that developed into what is Switzerland today. Their
oath is their mutual promise to act collectively and to jointly pursue a common interest,
making reference to a common history and family roots ("Yet are we but one race, born of
one blood, And all are children of one common home"). This indirectly hints at a recognition
of the general problem of moral hazard in teams and appeals to the role of group spirit and
in-group favoritism for overcoming the moral hazard problem. Second, as the benets of
alliance formation can be asymmetric, we may expect that players who would contribute a
disproportionately large share in the alliance prefer to stand alone. Wilhelm Tell himself,
the protagonist of the drama, behaves according to this principle. When Stau¤acher argues
that "even the weak grow strong by union", Tell counters the argument by claiming: "But
the strong man is the strongest when alone", and refuses to join the alliance.
Our framework builds on tournament theory where the reward scheme depends on relative
performance. Tournaments or contests are frequently used in organizations to incentivize and
motivate employees; the seminal paper on tournaments in labor markets is Lazear and Rosen
(1981). It analyzes exogenously given tournament structures; one process that determines
the tournament structure is the possibility of alliance formation. In many sectors, team
formation in the workplace has become increasingly popular.1 Moreover, the competition
1The implementation of self-managed work teams can lead to productivity increases (see Lazear and
Shaw 2007 for a discussion of the organization of work teams and the prevalence of teamwork). There
is also anecdotal evidence of companies that have benetted from allowing their employees to initiate
team formation (Wall Street Journal, 13 August 2007, How a Company Made Everyone a Team Player,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118696661138495617.html).
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with other individuals or teams, such as in the context of sales or product development
teams, can have an important e¤ect on group cohesion and the incentive problem within the
team. If several players form a team, this group formation adds a problem of moral hazard
in teams to the tournament: an individual members e¤ort benets all members of his
group. This positive externality has received considerable attention (Olson and Zeckhauser
1966, Holmstrom 1982). If the group competes with an out-group, an individual members
e¤ort also has a negative externality as it harms members of the competing group. These
externalities and the collective action problem make it di¢ cult to explain why alliances are
formed voluntarily. Economists recognized the formation of an alliance as a puzzle. In order
to explain the formation of alliances they resorted to technological benets of ghting in an
alliance (Skaperdas 1998, Kovenock and Roberson 2012), while political scientists explain
alliance formation with deterrence e¤ects and balancing behavior (Gulick 1955, Morgenthau
1963, Waltz 1979, Sorokin 1994) as a means to avoid violent conict or to end it more quickly.
As indicated by psychologists, the existence of an out-group can have an important e¤ect
on the emergence of in-group solidarity. Members of a group may develop a feeling to belong
to a group and their behavior may show in-group favoritism and spiteful attitudes towards the
out-group.2 These motivations exist even if individuals are exogenously grouped together.
Allowing individuals to choose whether or not to form a team can a¤ect the strength of
the feeling to belongand may have an impact on the individualscontributions to team
e¤ort. It also generates selection e¤ects. For instance, students are often allowed to submit
their homework in groups. However, when forming such study groups and deciding on their
own contribution, they have to take into account what the other studentswillingness to
form groups might tell them about their characteristics. Just as the example of Wilhelm
Tell suggests, such selection e¤ects together with the implications on individual choices and
group cohesion are salient features of alliance formation in contests.
We analyze moral hazard in groups and self-selection into alliances in a controlled lab-
oratory experiment in which players choose whether or not to enter into an alliance and
how much e¤ort to expend in the contest with an out-group. The framework that we have
chosen can be considered the generic framework to study alliance formation in the theory of
conict. Three players compete for a prize of a given size according to the rules of a Tullock
(1980) contest, which is a frequently analyzed type of tournament.3 Prior to this competi-
2See, e.g., Sherif et al. (1961), Tajfel and Turner (1979), Tajfel (1982). There is also evidence from
biology, and evolutionary game theory can explain such behavior (see, e.g., Maynard Smith 1974 and, for
more recent contributions, Eaton at el. 2011 and Konrad and Morath 2012).
3Alliances in contests have been extensively studied by theorists, see Ursprung (1990), Nitzan (1991),
Baik and Lee (2001), Esteban and Sákovics (2003), Konrad and Kovenock (2009), Kovenock and Roberson
(2012), and, for a survey, Konrad (2011).
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tion, two of these players are given the opportunity to join forces and form an alliance.4 We
focus on the implications of an alliance being an association that is based on a conscious
voluntary choice, compared to a framework in which the alliance is exogenously imposed.
In a purely consequentialist approach with symmetric players who are exclusively concerned
with their monetary payo¤s, the actual procedure that leads to an alliance cannot make a
di¤erence. However, procedures can matter, and voluntary alliance formation, compared to
exogenously imposed alliance play, may make a di¤erence. If players care for aspects other
than monetary payo¤s, voluntary choice for or against an alliance can induce selection ef-
fects. This may drive playersexpectations about what types of players they are likely to
be matched with if they choose to enter into an alliance, and what e¤orts their co-players
would expend. Moreover, the procedural aspect and the active commitment to ght jointly
may induce behavioral e¤ects. It may strengthen the feeling to belongif the alliance is the
outcome of a voluntary choice, compared to exogenously formed alliances; this group spirit
may induce stronger in-group favoritism. Again, this may be anticipated and consequently
inuence selection and cause behavioral reactions by other players.
To identify and isolate these potential e¤ects we compare interaction in a contest across
treatments with exogenous alliances and endogenous alliances where the outside option is
stand-alone play and where the out-group is always represented by one further player. We
track an individuals behavior in environments in which the individual does not have a choice,
but has to act as alliance player and stand-alone player, respectively. The e¤ort choices in
these "NO CHOICE" contests can then be related to their preferences on whether to form an
alliance or to stand alone. Moreover, the data on exogenous alliances provide the benchmark
against which we compare the behavior of endogenously formed alliances.
Some of the key ndings are as follows: Voluntary formation of an alliance is a frequent
outcome, even in situations in which players pay to enter into an alliance. Strong players,
however, have a preference for acting as stand-alone players, where "strong players" are
players who are committed to expend high e¤ort due to, for instance, a higher subjective
value of winning the contest. Because of the public good nature of individual contributions
to alliance e¤ort, strong players are "exploited" by their alliance partner when entering into
an alliance. Moreover, those "strong players" get a higher expected payo¤ in the stand-alone
contest. This explains their preference for standing alone and is much in line with Wilhelm
Tells point of view. We also nd that alliances which emerge from a voluntary choice of
the players mobilize signicantly more contest e¤ort than exogenously formed alliances. The
4The theory of alliance formation in contests has been considered, for instance, by Skaperdas (1998),
Garnkel (2004), Bloch et al. (2006), Sanchez-Pages (2007a,b), and Tan and Wang (2010). A recent survey
of the literature is Bloch (2012).
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moral hazard in teams is weakened if team formation is an endogenous process.
Empirically, alliances and their formation and resolution in conicts have been studied
by political scientists in the eld of international relations, using the ATOP (Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions Project) and the COW (Correlates of War) data sets.5 Precise
answers on the questions we address are di¢ cult to extract from these data for a number of
reasons. First, each international conict has a number of idiosyncratic aspects. Moreover,
international conict typically does not emerge as a singular event, but is embedded in a
specic historical context. Often, a conict cannot be understood or interpreted without
reference to preceding conict.
Within experimental economics, there is a growing literature that studies contests as well
as the interaction of contestants in groups against groups or against individuals, where the
groups are exogenously imposed on subjects (see, e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter 1997 for
an early experiment and Sutter and Strassmair 2009, Abbink et al. 2010, Sheremeta and
Zhang 2010, Ahn et al. 2011, Cherry and Cotten 2011, and Cason et al. 2012 for more
recent contributions; an excellent and comprehensive survey is Dechenaux et al. 2012).6 In a
complex, dynamic experiment, Smith et al. (2012) analyze the impact of group formation on
e¢ ciency "in anarchy" where subjects can invest in production, expropriation and defense.
Cherry et al. (2013) study the e¤ects of investment cost, group size and group formation
on contributions to a group public good in a framework where contributions reduce total
output available. They nd that individuals tend to vote for the socially optimal group size,
which is determined by the trade-o¤ between the e¤ects of individual investment on group
e¤ort and on total output. Choices to form groups have also been analyzed by Benenson
et al. (2009) wherein coalition formation with up to two ctional opponents changes the
(exogenously determined) probability of winning a prize. They nd that relative power
matters for coalition formation and that coalitions are more often formed with opponents
called "friends". We are not aware of any other experimental group contest in which groups
form endogenously and which is used to study the e¤ect of endogenizing group formation
as well as the question of which type of player self-selects into the alliance and which type
prefers to stand alone.7
5See Kimball (2006) and references therein. According to these, alliance formation increases with the
number of shared rivals, with the homogeneity of power and the similarity of the political system (democratic
versus autocratic states).
6This literature also analyzes multi-stage contests (Parco et al. 2005; Amaldoss and Rapoport 2005, 2009;
Amegashie et al. 2007; Sheremeta 2010a; Chark et al. 2011; Altmann et al. 2012; Ke et al. 2012, 2013).
Ke et al. (2012, 2013) examine three-player contests in a structurally related environment with exogenously
imposed alliances, focusing, however, on the impact of potential internal conict inside victorious alliances.
7In the context of contests between individuals, endogenous entry into tournaments and self-selection
e¤ects have been studied, for instance, by Eriksson et al. (2009), Cason et al. (2010), Dohmen and Falk
(2011), and Morgan et al. (2012).
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While the role of endogeneity for the moral hazard problem is seemingly unexplored in
experimental contests, endogenous group formation has attracted attention in a di¤erent
area of economic experiments: public goods games. The rst paper on endogenous group
formation in a public goods experiment is Ehrhart and Keser (1999), followed by a large
number of recent contributions to this eld. A focus of these studies has been on the
impact of di¤erent institutional rules and mechanisms on the resulting group size and level
of contributions, for instance, the role of entry and exit rules (Ahn et al. 2008 and 2009,
Charness and Yang 2011, Aimone et al. forthcoming), minimum contribution levels (e.g.,
Dannenberg et al. 2010) or punishment opportunities (e.g., Page et al. 2005, Sutter et
al. 2010); and endogenous group formation has been shown to increase cooperation (Keser
and Montmarquette 2011). Being interested in the stability of the groups formed or the
selection of conditional cooperators into the groups, all of these experiments use xed partner
matching. Our contribution to this literature is to study group formation and contributions
to a group-specic public good in the presence of an opponent out-group. This feature may
have an important e¤ect on individual behavior, even in our random matching design, that
is, in the absence of repeated interaction.
Our experiment is also related to the literature on in-group favoritism, which emanated
from social psychology (Sherif et al. 1961, Brewer 1979). In our contest framework of
competition with an out-group, group coherence and group spirit might be stronger if players
self-select into the alliance. This phenomenon of in-group bias, or group solidarity, and its
implications on economic outcomes have been analyzed and documented in a variety of
di¤erent economic interactions: for instance, prisoners dilemma and battle of the sexes
(Charness et al. 2007), minimum e¤ort games (Chen and Chen 2011), dictator and response
games (Chen and Li 2009), market experiments (Li et al. 2011) and investment decisions
(Sutter 2009).8 Most ndings in this literature support the emergence of in-group solidarity in
social interactions, especially if group membership is made salient. Our experimental contest
varies the salience of group membership by either exogenously imposing group formation onto
subjects or allowing subjects to voluntarily form groups.
8Subjects in these experiments were in most cases either randomly assigned into groups (minimal
groups) or divided according to their preferences over paintings. Goette et al. (2012a,b) analyze a prisoners
dilemma game with punishment opportunities, using randomly assigned groups which have built social ties
from real social interactions over a certain time period. Other naturally occurring group identities (tribes) are
utilized by Bernhard et al. (2006) for instance; Shayo and Zussman (2011) also use ethnic group membership
and document in-group bias in a eld experiment.
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2 Theoretical and experimental framework
2.1 Theoretical framework
Alliance formation and contest behavior are analyzed in two versions of a two-stage game
with three players A, B, and C. In the rst stage, a decision will be made about whether
players A and B act in an alliance or as stand-alone players; the two versions di¤er in whether
this decision is made exogenously (NO CHOICE environment) or endogenously (CHOICE
environment), as described below. In the second stage, the three players interact in a contest:
Here, each player i 2 fA;B;Cg chooses an e¤ort xi  0 that involves a cost which is equal
to the e¤ort itself.
Depending on whether or not players A and B are in an alliance in the subgame in
stage 2, this subgame is a contest between the alliance of players A and B and the out-group
player C (the "2-1" contest) or a symmetric three-player Tullock (1980) lottery contest
(the "1-1-1" contest). In the "2-1" contest, the probability that the alliance of A and B
wins is equal to the share of xA + xB in total e¤ort xA + xB + xC . In the "1-1-1" contest,
a player is probability of winning is equal to the share of his own e¤ort xi in total e¤ort
xA + xB + xC , for i 2 fA;B;Cg.
The equilibrium predictions for both subgames are given in Appendix A.1. If A and B
form an alliance, their joint equilibrium e¤ort in the subsequent "2-1" contest is only half of
what they would jointly expend in a three-player stand-alone contest (the "1-1-1" contest);
moreover, in equilibrium, the joint win probability for A and B in "2-1" is lower than in
"1-1-1". However, the reduction from three to two contesting parties reduces the intensity
of the conict, and the lower e¤ort costs just counterbalance the e¤ect of the free-riding
problem that an alliance faces. Overall, the expected monetary payo¤ for the alliance of
A and B in the "2-1" contest is exactly the same as what A and B together would get in
the "1-1-1" contest. The out-group player C is better o¤ in the "2-1" contest than in the
"1-1-1" contest, but in the game considered he does not make a decision about which contest
is played and is not our main focus of interest.
Our main research question compares exogenous alliances (NO CHOICE environment)
to endogenously formed alliances (CHOICE environment). If the "2-1" subgame is reached,
behavior within this subgame does not depend on the process that leads to the respective
subgame, provided that players are motivated by their monetary payo¤s only. In this case,
the theoretical benchmark suggests: whether alliances are formed endogenously or exoge-
nously is irrelevant for the playersbehavior in the contest subgame. Additional motivations
might, however, cause the process of alliance formation to have an impact on the equilibrium
outcome in the contest subgame, and we will discuss potential e¤ects after presenting the
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experimental design.
2.2 Experimental treatments
The "NO CHOICE" treatment serves as a baseline, and one interaction (round) proceeds as
follows. In the rst stage, the computer determines whether players A, B, and C interact in
a contest that follows the rules of the "1-1-1" contest as described in the theory section or
whether A and B are teamed up in an alliance, leading to a contest interaction that follows
the rules of the "2-1" contest. The subjects learn about this outcome and enter into stage 2
where all subjects simultaneously choose their contest e¤ort as a nonnegative integer. The
winner prize is V = 450 tokens; the loser prize is zero. Subjects pay as many tokens as they
have chosen as their "e¤ort", irrespective of winning or losing. After all subjects in the group
of three have chosen their e¤orts, they are shown the e¤ort choices of all players in their
group and a "fortune wheel" that determines the winning party.9 At the end of each round,
subjects are displayed their own realized payo¤ from that round. Subjects participated in 15
independent and structurally identical interactions of this type where the "2-1" contest was
selected in 10 out of the 15 rounds and the "1-1-1" contest was played in the remaining 5
rounds. The order of these contests was randomly chosen but was the same for all sessions.
After each interaction, the subjects were randomly rematched.
The second treatment is the "CHOICE" treatment, which di¤ers from the NO CHOICE
treatment in only one aspect: the decision process in stage 1 that either leads to the formation
of an alliance (subgame "2-1") or to stand-alone play by all players (subgame "1-1-1"). In
the CHOICE treatment, players A and B are rst asked independently and simultaneously
whether they would like to form an alliance or to stand alone. If A and B both choose "1-1-1"
or both choose "2-1", the subgame chosen is played. If A andB express diverging preferences,
they are matched into an alliance with probability 1=2 and stand alone otherwise.10 At the
beginning of stage 2, the decisions of players A and B are displayed to all three players A,
B, and C within a group. The subgame reached ("2-1" or "1-1-1") follows exactly the same
rules as in the NO CHOICE treatment. Like the NO CHOICE treatment, the CHOICE
treatment consists of 15 independent interactions with random rematching of subjects in
9The fortune wheel is a circle area with di¤erently colored segments, whose size is proportional to the
share of e¤ort. A pointer spins clockwise and then stops in one of the segments to determine the winner. In
the "1-1-1" contest, the fortune wheel consists of three segments, one for each player A, B, and C; in the
"2-1" contest, there are only two segments: one for the alliance of AB and another one for player C.
10An alternative rule could be that players only form an alliance if both A and B express this preference.
In this case, there always exists the trivial equilibrium where both players decide not to form an alliance:
independent of the own preference, this is a best response to the other players decision to stand alone.
Randomization in case of diverging preferences is a means to eliminate this (trivial) equilibrium and to
incentivize subjects to state their true preference.
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Figure 1: Sequence of actions in the CHOICE treatment.
each round.11 Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events in the CHOICE treatment. (In
the NO CHOICE treatment, Stage 1 in Figure 1 is replaced by a random device which selects
the subgame.)
All subjects participated in 15 rounds of the NO CHOICE treatment and 15 rounds of
the CHOICE treatment, keeping their role as player A, B, or C throughout all 30 rounds.
For half of the sessions, subjects started with the NO CHOICE treatment, followed by
the CHOICE treatment; for the other half of the sessions, the order of NO CHOICE and
CHOICE was reversed.12
2.3 Experimental procedures
To each of the computerized experimental sessions we typically admitted 18 subjects who
were randomly assigned a xed role ("player A", "player B", or "player C") at the beginning
of the experiment. Then, the subjects were divided into groups of three players (consisting
of one player of each role) and interacted exactly once before they were randomly regrouped,
keeping their role as player A, B or C. Although not having explicitly been stated in the
11The order in which the subgames are played now depends, of course, on the players choices in the
process of alliance formation.
12The rules of the rst treatment to be played (CHOICE or NO CHOICE ) were made common knowledge
at the beginning of the experiment, and the rules for the second treatment were made common knowledge
only after the rst treatment had been completed. Initially, the subjects were told that the experiment
would consist of two parts, but that the rules of the second part would only be announced after the end of
the rst part. A sample of the instructions is in Appendix B.5.
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experimental instructions, for the random matching we randomly divided the participants
of a session into matching groups of 9 subjects in order to avoid dependencies between all
observations of one session. Each subject had to go through the two treatments CHOICE
and NO CHOICE outlined above.
The theory section revealed an indi¤erence of players A and B between the choice of
"1-1-1" and "2-1" if all players are motivated by monetary incentives only and assuming
that alliance players play the symmetric equilibrium in the "2-1" contest. To break this
indeterminacy, we introduced a small monetary incentive for the choice between the two
subgames: In about one half of the sessions, players A and B each had to pay 5 tokens
whenever the "2-1" contest was played; in the other half of the sessions, A and B each had
to pay 5 tokens whenever the "1-1-1" contest was played. This small monetary incentive
(5 tokens compared to the prize of 450 tokens) helps to ensure that players carefully consider
their choice between the two games. The payment had to be made both in the CHOICE and
in the NO CHOICE treatment, and it had to be made by both players A and B, irrespective
of their own choice.13 Hence, the variations in terms of sequence of play (NO CHOICE rst
or CHOICE rst) and the small payment attached to one of the subgames (paying 5 tokens
either for "2-1" or for "1-1-1") led to four di¤erent types of sessions, each consisting of the
CHOICE and the NO CHOICE treatment. Each subject participated in exactly one of the
four session types.14
The experiment took place at the University of Munich and was programmed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). Overall, we conducted 17 sessions (3-5 sessions per session type) with
a total of 231 subjects, mainly students.15 To ensure that subjects properly understood the
rules of the game, they had to answer a set of pre-experimental questions.16 After having
completed the respective rounds of both the CHOICE and the NO CHOICE treatments,
subjects answered a set of postexperimental questions and took part in an incentivized
one-shot prisoners dilemma. Finally, each subject was paid separately and in private. A
participants payment consisted of (i) a EUR 4 show-up fee, (ii) his/her earnings in the
13Even if, from a theory perspective, this ex ante payment does not a¤ect e¤ort choices, it could have
induced the subjects to feel a sunk-cost e¤ect or an ex ante reduction of their endowment. Therefore,
imposing the fee in both treatments reduces the possibility of a biased e¤ort choice in the NO CHOICE
versus the CHOICE treatment. Moreover, if the payment had, for instance, to be made for the "2-1" contest
and only A voted for the "2-1" contest, also B had to pay 5 tokens in case "2-1" was realized. In this way
we avoid that a players choice depends on his beliefs about the co-players choice; there is no incentive to
vote in contradiction to the own preference, hoping to save the 5 tokens. Also, when entering the contest
game, the alliance players A and B remain symmetric in terms of "sunk cost" or "budget".
14Table B.1 in the appendix summarizes the di¤erent session types.
15On average, subjects were 23.5 years old, about 28% had an economics background and 61% were
females.
16At the beginning of the experiment all subjects rst played two trial periods: one round of the "1-1-1"
contest followed by one round of the "2-1" contest.
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prisoners dilemma, (iii) a payment of EUR 0.60 for each of the 30 rounds (which essentially
served as their endowment in the contest), and (iv) the prots (possibly negative) earned in
6 randomly selected rounds of the experiment.17 The exchange rate used in all sessions was
45 tokens = EUR 1, that is, the value of the prize in a round selected for payment was equal
to EUR 10. A session took about one and a half hours, and subjects earned an average of
EUR 24 (with a standard deviation of EUR 10, a minimum of EUR 0 and a maximum of
EUR 52.50) plus the show-up fee.
2.4 Main predictions
The fundamental question that motivates our analysis is on the determinants of alliance
formation and alliance success. What explains a players choice to form an alliance? What
are the implications of self-selection into alliances for alliance success? To what degree does
the ability of alliances to mobilize joint e¤ort depend on the individualsdecision to form
an alliance, compared to a situation where the alliance is formed by nature?
The main hypothesis that we want to test with the experimental data is motivated by a
rational choice perspective on alliances: Average alliance e¤ort is not a¤ected by the process
of alliance formation.
Hypothesis 1 In the "2-1" contest of the alliance AB against the single player C, the aver-
age e¤ort of an alliance player is the same in exogenously formed alliances and in voluntarily
formed alliances.
If individuals are homogeneous and maximize their monetary payo¤s, the data obtained
in the experiment should provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1: Average alliance e¤ort
should be the same in the NO CHOICE treatment and the CHOICE treatment.18 There
are, however, several e¤ects that could cause e¤ort to be dependent on the process of alliance
formation. First, there could be a psychological e¤ect of a conscious choice to form an alliance
that is absent in the model outlined in appendix A.1. Being together in a voluntarily formed
alliance may induce higher in-group solidarity, leading to a higher willingness to expend
e¤ort in order to increase the joint prospect of victory. Given the considerable evidence
on in-group favoritism, the role that competing out-groups play for the behavior of players
inside a group and the importance of building a group identity for in-group behavior, we
17At the end of the experiment, 3 out of the 15 rounds of each treatment were randomly drawn for
payment. Bankruptcy of players was avoided by giving them a su¢ ciently high endowment.
18Note that Hypothesis 1 holds for all four session types, that is, independently of the order of play or
the small payment that has to be made for one of the contest games.
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would expect behavior that systematically deviates from the irrelevance result summarized
in Hypothesis 1.19
Second, there may be a correlation between individual-specic characterisitics especially
a players willingness to expend e¤ort and the individual propensity to form an alliance.20
Thus, a di¤erence between e¤orts in endogenous and exogenous alliances (and hence a re-
jection of Hypothesis 1) may also be driven by a selection of certain types of players into
alliances. Concentrating on the selection issue, we set up two mutually exclusive testable
statements which summarize the two possibilities that might emerge:
Hypothesis 2 a) Individuals who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort are relatively
more likely to enter into an alliance.
b) Individuals who typically expend less-than-average e¤ort are relatively more likely to enter
into an alliance.
If (some) players derive a non-monetary utility from winning and if this causes e¤ort
choices to be higher (Sheremeta 2010b), then players who are particularly keen on winning
might choose to form an alliance because they expect their probability of winning to be higher
in alliances.21 This would make players who typically expend higher-than-average e¤ort more
likely to form alliances (Hypothesis 2a), and self-selection of such "strong players" (in terms
of their e¤ort choice) would lead to higher e¤orts in endogenous alliances.
On the other hand, players who usually expend higher-than-average e¤ort bear a larger
share of the cost of alliance e¤ort and therefore have a lower monetary payo¤ than their
co-player in the alliance. These "strong players" might want to stay away from forming an
alliance in order to avoid being "exploited" by their co-player. The subsample of players in
endogenously formed alliances would then be made up of individuals who typically expend
less-than-average e¤ort (Hypothesis 2b), and the self-selection of players investing relatively
little would make endogenously formed alliances less successful, compared to exogenously
given alliances.
Finally, if individual e¤ort is (positively or negatively) correlated with the individual
preference for alliance formation, then players may take the other players choice of alliance
formation into account to update their beliefs about this players type. The anticipation of
the co-players behavior may have an impact on the own e¤ort choice. This might cause e¤ort
19Moreover, there might be a purely psychological e¤ect of giving players the option to select the game
they would like to play.
20Individual-specic characteristics and their importance for playerse¤ort levels in experimental contests
between individuals have been analyzed by e.g., Price and Sheremeta (2012).
21Empirically, players A and B have a higher probability of winning in the "2-1" contest than in the
"1-1-1" contest, although theoretically the probability of winning should be the same.
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in voluntarily formed alliances to be di¤erent from e¤ort in exogenously formed alliances,
wherein individuals cannot form beliefs about their co-players type from stage 1 choices.
Such strategic reactions to the co-players decision on alliance formation will crucially depend
on the evidence on Hypothesis 2.
In total, given these hypotheses, endogenous alliance formation may potentially evoke
e¤ects that work in opposite directions. Our data allow us to analyze the determinants of
a players choice to form an alliance and therefore to draw conclusions on the self-selection
e¤ect. In particular, to test the statements summarized in Hypothesis 2, we can examine the
impact of an individuals average e¤ort in the NO CHOICE treatment on this individuals
decision for or against alliance formation in the CHOICE treatment. Here, average e¤ort in
the NO CHOICE treatment is used as a proxy for the e¤ort that "the individual typically
expends" in situations where this e¤ort choice cannot be a¤ected by the process of alliance
formation.
In addition, with the data generated by the experiment, we can analyze various further
questions on the behavior of players in voluntarily chosen three-player contests (the "1-1-1"
contest), on the behavior of the single player C (including a possible reaction of the single
player C to the nature of alliance formation, as the alliance players choices on alliance
formation are made common knowledge), and on the overall e¤ect for contest outcomes.
3 Results
Our main hypothesis addresses the impact of alliance formation on contest behavior, compar-
ing voluntarily formed to randomly formed alliances (CHOICE vs. NO CHOICE). Figure 2
illustrates time series of average e¤ort by alliance players and stand-alone players in "2-1"
contests. First of all, as known from other contest experiments, individuals expend more
e¤ort than theoretically predicted.22 This holds both for the alliance players and for the
out-group player.23 Moreover, Figure 2 shows that average e¤ort of players in voluntarily
formed alliances is higher than average e¤ort in randomly, and thus exogenously, formed
alliances. This treatment e¤ect of CHOICE is in contrast to the standard theory prediction
22Explanations for overdissipation and a high variability in e¤orts include spite and inequality aversion
(Herrmann and Orzen 2008), non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta 2010b), risk preferences (Millner
and Pratt 1991), endowment e¤ects (Price and Sheremeta 2012), and mistakes (Potters et al. 1998).
23For alliance players, this overdissipation is reduced in later rounds; hence, average e¤ort is lower in part
2 of the experiment, and this holds consistently for both treatments NO CHOICE and CHOICE. See also
Table B.2 in the appendix, which summarizes average e¤ort of alliance players in the NO CHOICE and in
the CHOICE treatment, depending on the order in which these two treatments have been played.
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Figure 2: Individual e¤ort in "2-1" contests.
in Hypothesis 1, and we will analyze this result in more detail below.24
It is also worth mentioning that, despite the increase in mobilized e¤ort, voluntarily
formed alliances are not more successful than exogenously formed alliances. Their probability
of winning is almost the same in the CHOICE and in the NO CHOICE treatments (on
average, 48:2% in CHOICE vs. 47:3% in NO CHOICE). This is due to the higher average
e¤ort of the stand-alone player when facing voluntarily formed alliances (CHOICE) than
when facing exogenously formed alliances (NO CHOICE). Because of the greater amount of
e¤ort expended, the monetary payo¤ of voluntarily formed alliances is lower than the payo¤
of randomly formed alliances (40:4 compared to 46:8).
3.1 Decisions on alliance formation
The di¤erence in e¤ort choices of voluntarily compared to randomly formed alliances can
be caused by many factors; in particular, the observations for voluntarily formed alliances
may not originate from the same sample of individuals as the observations for exogenously
formed alliances. Instead, there may be several selection e¤ects at work. Hence, before we
turn to the analysis of individual e¤ort choices, we examine the determinants of the choice
24It is important to note that this e¤ect cannot be attributed to repeated games e¤ects, as it occurs in a
framework where individuals are randomly rematched in each round.
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of whether or not to form an alliance.
Table 1 presents the results of random-e¤ects logistic regressions of a player A or Bs
decision to form an alliance, vit.25 The dependent variable is equal to 1 if, in round t, player
i 2 fA;Bg chooses to form an alliance and 0 otherwise.26 For all estimations in Table 1, the
vector of explanatory variables contains two dummy variables that control for the di¤erent
session types we run: the variable "C-NC" indicates that the CHOICE treatment was played
rst and the dummy "PAY2-1" is equal to 1 whenever players A and B had to make a small
payment in case the "2-1" contest was played.27
While the order of play does not signicantly a¤ect decisions on alliance formation, the
probability of a vote for alliance formation is signicantly lower whenever the small fee was
applied to the "2-1" contest. To quantify the e¤ect of the payment in terms of probabilities,
the overall share of players A and B who vote for the "2-1" contest is 62:6% when the
payment had to be made for "1-1-1" and 49:3% when the payment was applied to "2-1"
(focusing on rounds 6-15). The small monetary incentives for or against alliance formation
have worked in the predicted way, but have left scope for individual-specic characteristics
to explain the propensity to enter into an alliance.
A focus of our interest is on individual-specic characteristics that explain the decision to
join an alliance. From Estimation (2) onwards, we include socioeconomic information from
the exit questionnaire as control variables; yet none of these variables signicantly explain
individual choices.28 In addition, the vector of explanatory variables contains an individuals
e¤ort levels in the contests of the NO CHOICE treatment in two di¤erent ways.
First, (xi xA;B)1 1 1NC is an individuals average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO
CHOICE treatment, compared to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in the "1-1-1"
contests of the NO CHOICE treatment.29 Estimations (2) and (4) show that e¤ort levels
in exogenously selected "1-1-1" contests signicantly inuence the probability to vote for
alliance formation. Players who typically contribute more than the average player A or B in
25The reported results focus on experienced behavior (rounds 6-15) to reduce the impact of learning.
Including observations from all rounds into the estimation does, however, not qualitatively a¤ect the results.
26Note that this does not imply that the "2-1" contest is played in this round since the selection of the
contest variant also depends on the choice of the potential alliance partner.
27Recall that in half of the sessions the NO CHOICE treatment was played rst and in the other half the
order was reversed and that individual choices on alliance formation were incentivized by a small payment
to be made for either the "2-1" or the "1-1-1" contest (each variant in about half of the sessions).
28The included variables are age, gender, eld of study, number of siblings, height, and action chosen in
the incentivized prisoners dilemma played at the end of the experiment.
29This variable is computed exclusively from the observations of the NO CHOICE treatment in order to
identify a players "type" in situations where it cannot be a¤ected by the preceding choice of the game. More
specically, it is an individuals average e¤ort level in all "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment
minus the average e¤ort by all players A or B in all "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment (averaged
over all sessions, i.e., independent of order and pay rule).
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Dependent variable: choice of alliance formation
(vit=1 if choice = "2-1", i = A;B, t = round)
Indep. var.
xtlogit
(1)
xtlogit
(2)
xtlogit
(3)
xtlogit
(4)
Constant 0.722* 0.898* 0.974* 0.797
(0.412) (0.512) (0.523) (0.509)
C-NC 0.396 0.483 0.377 0.478
(=1 if CHOICE rst) (0.466) (0.465) (0.480) (0.474)
PAY2-1 -0.927** -0.826* -0.860* -0.790*
(=1 if fee for "2-1") (0.466) (0.467) (0.478) (0.464)
(xi xA;B)1 1 1NC -0.007** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)
(xi xA;B)2 1NC -0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) 
2 1i  1 1 1i

NC
0.004
(0.002)
Socioeconomics NO YES YES YES
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1540
Log likelihood -751.73 -747.83 -750.71 -747.54
Random-e¤ects logistic regression (154 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signicant
at the 1 percent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior).
Observations from "NO CHOICE rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group. "C-NC" and "PAY2-1"
are control variables for the di¤erent session types; (xi xA;B)1 1 1NC and (xi xA;B)2 1NC are an individuals
average e¤orts in the NO CHOICE treatment (in the "1-1-1" and the "2-1" contests, respectively), compared
to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in these contests.
 
2 1i  1 1 1i

NC
is an individuals average
payo¤ in "2-1" contests compared to his average payo¤ in "1-1-1" contests from the NO CHOICE treatment.
Table 1: Individual decision on alliance formation in the CHOICE phase.
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these contests are signicantly less likely to choose alliance formation. This speaks in favor
of Hypothesis 2b, rejecting Hypothesis 2a.
Second, (xi xA;B)2 1NC is an individuals average e¤ort in the "2-1" contests of the NO
CHOICE treatment, compared to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in the "2-1"
contests of theNO CHOICE treatment. An individuals average e¤ort in the "2-1" contests is
positively correlated with his e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests. However, Estimations (3) and (4)
suggest that an individuals e¤ort expended in exogenously formed alliances cannot explain
the selection of players into endogenously formed alliances: the coe¢ cient of (xi xA;B)2 1NC
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Result 1 a) Individuals who typically expend high e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests are signicantly
less likely to form an alliance. b) Whether or not an individual typically expends high e¤ort
in the "2-1" contests does not signicantly inuence the likelihood of alliance formation.
The di¤erence in Result 1 is quite intuitive: While e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests may
reect a subjects desire to win most closely, e¤ort in the "2-1" contests may be a¤ected
by additional motivations. These may include solidarity with the fellow alliance partner or
in-group favoritism more generally. Such in-group altruism in "2-1" contests might increase
the probability of a vote for alliance formation and thus countervail the e¤ect of higher
commitment to expend e¤ort.
As a further explanatory variable, Estimation (4) includes the di¤erence between an
individuals average payo¤ in the "2-1" contests and in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO
CHOICE treatment. The estimated coe¢ cient of this variable
 
2 1i  1 1 1i

NC
is positive
although only borderline signicant (p-value: 0:109): The higher the monetary advantage
from playing the "2-1" contest, the more likely it is that a player votes for the "2-1" contest.30
The results on how a players commitment to spend e¤ort impacts decisions about alliance
formation lead to an important conclusion: Higher e¤orts in voluntarily formed alliances
cannot be a result of what could be called a direct selection e¤ect. The increase in e¤orts
is not solely caused by players who typically expend high e¤ort in "2-1" contests, selecting
themselves into alliances in the CHOICE treatment.
30On average, players have a higher monetary payo¤ in the "2-1" contest than in the "1-1-1" contest; this
can also explain the prevalent choice of the "2-1" contest. Moreover, players who typically choose higher-
than-average e¤ort have a smaller monetary advantage from actually choosing the "2-1" contest because
they earn relatively more in the "1-1-1" contest, and they vote accordingly.
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3.2 E¤ort of alliance players in "2-1" contests
We now compare alliance players e¤ort in exogenous and voluntarily formed alliances.31
Table 2 shows the results of random-e¤ects regressions of xit, the e¤ort of an alliance player
i 2 fA;Bg in the "2-1" contest (in round t). All estimations include our main variable
of interest, "CHOICE", which is equal to 1 in the CHOICE treatment and equal to 0 in
the NO CHOICE treatment; "CHOICE" identies whether the observed e¤ort stems from
voluntarily or from randomly formed alliances. Moreover, all four regressions include session
controls.32 Estimations (2)-(4) also control for socioeconomic characteristics as obtained
from the exit questionnaire.33
Alliance players expend 9:6  9:7 points more if the alliance emerges endogenously. The
coe¢ cient of "CHOICE" is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1%-level and robust
throughout all estimations of the full sample (Estimations (1)-(3)) and to controlling for
individual-specic characteristics. As the summary statistics have already suggested, en-
dogenous alliance formation leads to an increased mobilization of e¤orts.34
Result 2 Individuals in voluntarily formed alliances contribute signicantly more e¤ort than
individuals in randomly and exogenously formed alliances.
Note that the higher e¤ort in endogenous alliances is not due to a selection of players, but
occurs despite of such selection: High-e¤ort types are more likely to stand alone; accordingly,
fewer of them are members of an endogenously formed alliance than of an alliance that is
randomly imposed on all players.35 The e¤ect of higher e¤ort in voluntary alliances outweighs
a possible selection e¤ect that tends to operate in the opposite direction.
31The reported results are again based on experienced behavior (rounds 6-15) and are robust to including
observations from all rounds, using a tobit estimation to account for the truncation of e¤ort levels at 0,
or estimating a multilevel mixed e¤ects model to control for possible dependence at the level of matching
groups.
32The session dummies included are again "C-NC" indicating that CHOICE was played rst and "PAY2-
1" indicating that the incentivizing payment had to be made for the "2-1" contest. As Table 2 shows, neither
the order of the treatments nor the fee to be paid for either of the games has a signicant e¤ect on e¤ort
choices.
33As before, the included variables are age, gender, eld of study, number of siblings, height, and action
chosen in an incentivized prisoners dilemma played at the end of the experiment. None of these signicanly
a¤ect e¤ort levels in our experiment.
34This result is conrmed by a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test that compares average alliance e¤ort
per matching group across the two phases (25 paired observations in total, p-value: 0:005). Figure B.3 in the
appendix provides additional evidence on this treatment e¤ect by showing that the distribution of alliance
e¤orts in the CHOICE treatment rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of alliance e¤orts in
NO CHOICE.
35Table 2 shows: the higher individual e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of NO CHOICE, the higher is
the individual e¤ort in "2-1" contests (compare the coe¢ cient of (xi xA;B)1 1 1NC ), but the lower is the
probability to enter into an alliance (compare Table 1).
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Dependent variable: individual e¤ort xit of alliance players A and B
in the "2-1" contest (alliance AB vs. player C)
Indep. var.
xtreg
(1)
xtreg
(2)
xtreg
(3)
xtreg
(4)
Constant 52.4*** 51.1*** 51.0*** 55.1***
(5.09) (6.03) (6.02) (6.00)
CHOICE 9.7*** 9.6*** 9.6*** 4.6**
(=1 if CHOICE treatment) (1.99) (1.99) (1.98) (2.06)
C-NC 2.3 1.5 2.0 -4.5
(=1 if CHOICE rst) (5.68) (5.43) (5.42) (5.44)
PAY2-1 -3.6 -3.7 -3.9 -6.0
(=1 if fee for "2-1") (5.67) (5.44) (5.43) (5.45)
(xi xA;B)1 1 1NC 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
(xi xA;B)1 1 1NC  CHOICE 0.09*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.03)
Socioeconomics NO YES YES YES
Observations 1790 1790 1790 1456 #
R2 0.0117 0.0798 0.0825 0.0828
Random-e¤ects regression (154 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signicant at the 1 per-
cent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior). "CHOICE"
indicates whether the observation stems from a voluntarily formed alliance; "C-NC" and "PAY2-1" are con-
trol variables for the di¤erent session types; (xi xA;B)1 1 1NC is an individuals average e¤ort in the "1-1-1"
contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to average e¤ort of all players A or B in these contests.
Observations from "NO CHOICE rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group.
# Estimation (4) restricts observations in the CHOICE treatment to the subsample where both players A
and B voted for alliance formation (i.e., (vit; v it) = (1; 1)).
Table 2: Alliance playerse¤ort in the "2-1" contest.
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Estimation (3) provides additional information on who reacts most to the endogenous
process of alliance formation. Individuals A or B who expend more-than-average e¤ort
in exogenously imposed "1-1-1" contests do not only expend more e¤ort overall in "2-1"
contests, but they also increase their e¤ort more strongly in the CHOICE treatment: The
interaction term of (xi xA;B)1 1 1NC with the dummy "CHOICE" is signicantly positive,
suggesting that the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE" is stronger for those players who expend
more-than-average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment. High-e¤ort
subjects dislike forming an alliance, but if they end up in an alliance because their co-players
want it, they react with strongly increasing their e¤ort.
Result 3 Voluntary alliance formation leads to a stronger e¤ort increase for those indi-
viduals who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests and who typically
prefer to stand alone.
As a direct consequence of this result, the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE" should be
smaller when excluding the observations of voluntarily formed alliances where one of the
alliance players voted against alliance formation, as done in Estimation (4). In this restricted
sample of observations of unanimously formed alliances, the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE"
becomes smaller (around 4:6 points) but is still signicantly di¤erent from zero (at the 5%-
level). The fact that e¤ort in unanimously formed alliances is still higher than average e¤ort
in exogenously formed alliances (which include the high e¤ort individuals) might be caused
by a stronger feeling of in-group altruism in voluntarily formed alliances.
An additional explanation for the positive e¤ect of endogenous alliance formation and, in
particular, for the strong reaction of the individuals typically investing a lot is illustrated in
Table 3. Here, average e¤ort of alliance players in CHOICE is separated according to their
own and their potential partners votes on alliance formation, vit and v it respectively.36
Table 3 shows that alliance members tend to increase their e¤ort when their co-player
voted for alliance formation (and presumably is a "low-e¤ort type"): First, individuals who
voted for alliance formation (vit = 1) choose higher e¤ort if their co-player also decided to
form an alliance than if their co-player voted against alliance formation (59:4 compared to
49:6). Hence, individuals react to their co-players decision on alliance formation and adjust
their e¤ort choices accordingly. Facing a co-player who voted against alliance formation,
individuals may anticipate that their fellow alliance member would choose a relatively high
e¤ort. This could explain why they expend less own e¤ort if they are in an alliance with
such co-players. Second, the highest e¤ort in "2-1" contests is expended by individuals who
36Recall that, if A and B did not vote uniformly for or against an alliance, one of the two contest variants,
"1-1-1" or "2-1", was randomly selected.
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Average e¤ort xi, i = A;B in "2-1" contests conditional on
the decisions on alliance formation in the respective round
E¤ort #obs.
NO CHOICE (overall for i=A,B)
51.9
(2.96)
924
CHOICE (overall for i=A,B)
62.9
(3.86)
866
- xi if (vit; v it) = (1; 1) :
59.4
(4.45)
532
- xi if (vit; v it) = (1; 0) :
49.6
(4.95)
167
- xi if (vit; v it) = (0; 1) :
87.4
(7.09)
167
Calculated is the average e¤ort of players i=A,B conditional on the own decision vit and the co-players
decision v it on whether to vote for alliance formation (vit=1 if, in round t, i voted for the "2-1" contest).
Observations from rounds 6-15 only. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
Table 3: Alliance e¤ort in the "2-1" contests conditional on the choices on alliance formation.
voted against alliance formation but ended up in an alliance because their co-player voted
in favor of formation of an alliance (87:4 on average if (vit; v it) = (0; 1)).
If individuals who vote against alliance formation end up being in an alliance in the
CHOICE treatment, they know that their co-player wanted to form an alliance which
seemingly goes hand-in-hand with lower e¤ort levels. If the individuals are keen on win-
ning and want to maintain their chances of winning, they have to make up for the lower
e¤ort of their co-player by increasing their own e¤ort. Therefore, the increase in e¤orts by
the individuals who voted against alliance formation can be interpreted as a behavior that
accommodates to the co-players anticipated behavior. Similar strategic reactions to the
alliance playersvotes in stage 1 can also be found for the out-group player, as we will see
in the next section.
3.3 Additional results on individual e¤ort choices
3.3.1 E¤ort of stand-alone players in "2-1" contests
In the following, we shortly examine how the (stand-alone) players C react to the higher
e¤orts of voluntarily formed alliances. Remember that the roles of the subjects were xed
throughout the experiment. Also recall that players C have no inuence on whether they
ght against an alliance or against two single players. Hence, there is no selection e¤ect for
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these stand-alone players. Estimating player Cs e¤ort choice in parallel to the estimations
for the e¤ort of players A and B (from Table 2), we nd that Cs e¤ort against voluntarily
formed alliances (CHOICE) is 13 points higher than Cs e¤ort against exogenously formed
alliances; this increase is signicant and robust throughout all estimations.37 (The regression
results are in Table A.1 in the appendix.)38
Stand-alone players knew if the alliance they were facing was voluntarily formed (CHOICE),
and they knew the alliance playersindividual decisions on whether to form an alliance (there
was complete information in the contest stage). If we separate player Cs e¤ort choice ac-
cording to whether one or both of the alliance players voted for alliance formation, we nd
that the stand-alone players e¤ort is lower (by 14:2 points) when facing an alliance wherein
both individuals had voted for alliance formation than when facing an alliance wherein
one of the alliance members had voted for the "1-1-1" contest (compare the coe¢ cient of
"I(vA;t;vB;t)=(1;1)CHOICE" in Estimation 4 of Table A.1 in the appendix). Again, this be-
havior can constitute an optimal reply to the anticipated alliance e¤ort which is highest in
alliances that contain individuals who actually prefer to ght on their own.
3.3.2 E¤ort of players A or B in "1-1-1" contests
The experiment also reveals additional ndings on contest behavior in three-player individual
contests (the "1-1-1" contests). While the theory prediction for individual e¤ort is 100,
observed e¤ort is considerably higher, in line with previous ndings. Moreover, average e¤ort
of players A and B is higher when the "1-1-1" contest is played as a result of player A and
Bs choice than when this scenario is randomly selected (155:6 compared to 136:0).39 This
result can be seen as a straightforward selection e¤ect. When players have the choice, those
players who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests are signicantly
more likely to vote for the stand-alone contest (compare the estimation results in Table 1).
Just as for the e¤orts in the "2-1" contest, we can separate average e¤ort in the CHOICE
treatment according to the individualsdecisions on alliance formation (see Table A.2 in the
appendix). For those individuals who actually voted in favor of alliance formation (i.e., if
vit = 1), "1-1-1" e¤orts in the CHOICE treatment are lower compared to NO CHOICE
37Using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, however, the di¤erence of player Cs e¤ort in the NO
CHOICE compared to the CHOICE treatment is insignicant (p-value: 0:1742).
38Those stand-alone players who invest more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests in NO CHOICE also
invest more e¤ort in the "2-1" contests. Again, individual e¤orts of a player C in "1-1-1" and in "2-1"
contests are positively correlated.
39Estimating e¤ort of players A and B in the "1-1-1" contest similar to the estimations of the e¤ort in
"2-1" contests (as in Table 2) yields a coe¢ cient of CHOICE of about +17 which is throughout signicant
at the 1%-level. The p-value of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test testing this di¤erence at the matching group
level is 0:0283. Compare also the time series of e¤orts in "1-1-1" contests in Figure B.4 in the appendix.
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(114:6 compared to 136:0). For players who voted in favor of the "1-1-1" contest (i.e.,
if vit = 0), "1-1-1" e¤orts are higher than the average e¤ort in NO CHOICE.40 While the
possibility to choose which contest to play also leads to increased e¤orts in "1-1-1" contests on
the aggregate level, this e¤ect is to a large extent caused by a selection of highly competitive
individuals into these stand-alone contests.
4 Conclusion
Our analysis aimed at a better understanding of alliance formation in contests. Why are al-
liances formed and which factors determine whether an individual prefers to form an alliance
or to stand alone? What are the implications of voluntary alliance formation on e¤orts and
in-group solidarity? Key insights from our analysis are as follows.
(1) Players who are committed to expending amounts of e¤ort that are much above
average are inclined to stand alone. In this respect, our analysis is in line with the behavior
of Friedrich Schillers protagonist Wilhelm Tell: a "strong player" is stronger when standing
alone than when he forms an alliance. The nding is also in line with the rational choice
calculus of players who are willing to expend high e¤ort. Players who have a higher subjective
valuation of winning the contest anticipate that they will contribute more e¤ort than others
and that, in an alliance, other players inside their alliance may free-ride on them. This
makes such "strong players" bear a disproportionately high share of the cost of alliance
e¤ort; hence, they prefer to stand alone. The other players who are less eager to expend
much e¤ort, however, benet from this free-riding possibility.
(2) Whether players team up in an alliance on a voluntary basis or are forced to play
as members of an alliance is important for their performance in the alliance. On average,
players in a voluntary alliance expend more resources than players in a forced alliance. This
result is obtained when comparing the e¤orts of players who self-select into an alliance and
the e¤orts of players from the full sample who are forced into an alliance. We nd that
this higher e¤ort in voluntary alliances is not a consequence of straightforward selection, but
occurs even though there is a selection e¤ect that downward-biases e¤ort in the voluntary
alliance. By (1), selection suggests that voluntary alliances are formed by players who
expend comparatively little e¤ort, whereas forced alliances consist of an unbiased sample of
players. The higher e¤orts in voluntarily formed alliances are in line with results on in-group
favoritism in psychology if one assumes that the voluntary association of an alliance has
stronger group-formation power than the simple exogenous formation of alliances.
40Those individuals increase their e¤ort even further when facing a co-player who would have preferred
to play in an alliance (on average 189:0 if v it = 1 compared to 159:4 if v it = 0).
23
(3) The e¤ect of voluntary alliance formation is largest in alliances that only one of the
alliance players voted for. The larger e¤ect arises because those players who voted against
alliance formation show a particularly strong reaction to playing in an endogenously formed
alliance. In those endogenously formed alliances, a players vote for or against alliance forma-
tion contains information about the individual willingness to expend e¤ort. Consequently,
the individuals who voted against alliance formation but end up in an alliance seem to cor-
rectly anticipate the lower e¤ort choice of their fellow alliance member who voted for alliance
formation; in order to compensate for this low e¤ort and to keep their chances of winning
high, they strongly increase their own e¤ort. This high e¤ort, however, is also anticipated
by the alliance partners who, in turn, reduce their e¤ort contribution. Similar strategic
reactions can be observed on the part of the stand-alone players who, facing voluntarily
formed alliances, increase their e¤ort accordingly and who choose particularly high e¤ort
when ghting against an alliance wherein one of the players voted against alliance formation
and subsequently chooses high e¤ort.
Overall, we nd evidence for higher in-group favoritism, causing alliance e¤ort to be
higher in voluntarily formed alliances. We also nd that players who are willing to expend
high e¤ort correctly anticipate that they are exploited if in an alliance and prefer to stand
alone. These ndings have important implications for curbing or intensifying competition
in contests and tournaments or, more specically, for the design of work structures in labor
markets. A contest designer interested in maximizing the total e¤ort expended can best
achieve this goal by preventing the formation of teams and letting the individuals interact
as single players. However, a substantial share of individuals has shown to have a preference
for competing in groups, even if alliance formation implies having to pay a fee. Taking
this preference for alliance formation into account, it is advisable to let individuals choose
freely whether or not to form groups. It strengthens their willingness to contribute to group
success more than if the team structure is imposed on them. This holds despite the fact
that voluntary group formation leads to a selection of less win-motivated individuals into
the team. Moreover, as individuals understand this selection e¤ect and react to it when
choosing their own contribution, a contest designer who wants to elicit high e¤ort choices
may prefer to team up "weak" and "strong" individuals: In our experiment, the largest e¤ect
on group e¤ort, i.e. the largest increase in contributions, has been observed in the "mixed"
alliances where an individual who voted against alliance formation (over)compensated for
the low (expected) e¤ort of his co-player (compare Table 3; this also holds for total e¤ort
of all three players). Therefore, while participant involvement in the procedure of alliance
formation leads to stronger in-group solidarity, a procedure that benets such types of mixed
group compositions may also be desirable when designing tournament environments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium analysis
The "1-1-1" contest. In the "1-1-1" contest, each player i 2 fA;B;Cg chooses a
nonnegative e¤ort xi; the choices are made simultaneously and independently. The vector
of e¤ort choices (xA; xB; xC) determines is expected payo¤ as
1 1 1i = piV   xi; i 2 fA;B;Cg :
Here, pi constitutes the probability that player i 2 fA;B;Cg wins the contest, in which case
he is attributed a prize of value V . With probability 1   pi player i does not win, and is
attributed a prize of value zero. Independently of winning or losing the contest, player i has
to bear the cost of his own e¤ort xi, which is assumed to be equal to the e¤ort itself (hence
equal to xi). Player is probability of winning is
pi =
xi
xA + xB + xC
if xA + xB + xC > 0; and pi = 1=3 if all three contestants expend zero e¤ort.41 The Nash
equilibrium of this contest is known to be unique and characterized by e¤ort choices
 
x1 1 1i

=
2
9
V; i 2 fA;B;Cg (1)
and expected payo¤s  
1 1 1i

=
1
9
V; i 2 fA;B;Cg : (2)
The "2-1" contest. In the "2-1" contest, players A and B are in alliance and compete
against player C. As in "1-1-1", each player i 2 fA;B;Cg chooses a nonnegative e¤ort xi,
and all players choose their e¤ort independently and simultaneously. The vector of action
choices (xA; xB; xC) determines individual expected payo¤ as
2 1i = pAB
V
2
  xi; i 2 fA;Bg
2 1C = (1  pAB)V   xC
41This contest success function is used in many areas of economics, including marketing, rent-seeking,
military conict and sports competition. It has several axiomatic and microeconomic underpinnings. For a
detailed review see Konrad (2009, Chapter 2.3).
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where the probability pAB that the alliance of A and B wins is dened as
pAB =
xA + xB
xA + xB + xC
(3)
if xA + xB + xC > 0 and pAB = 1=2 otherwise. If the alliance wins, players A and B receive
equal shares of the prize V ; if player C wins, he gets the full prize V . All losers get zero.
By (3), the alliances probability of winning depends on the sum of alliance memberse¤orts
and not on the composition of xA + xB; alliance memberse¤orts are perfect substitutes
when determining the alliances win probability.
Nitzan (1991) showed that the equilibrium of this "2-1" contest is characterized by e¤ort
choices  
x2 1A + x
2 1
B

=
1
9
V and
 
x2 1C

=
2
9
V (4)
and equilibrium payo¤s
 
2 1A + 
2 1
B

=
2
9
V and
 
2 1C

=
4
9
V: (5)
As the marginal cost of e¤ort is constant and pAB depends on the sum of xA and xB, only
the sum of alliance playerse¤orts is uniquely determined in equilibrium.42
A comparison of (2) and (5) shows that the sum of the expected payo¤s of A and B is
the same in the "2-1" contest as in the "1-1-1" contest; the expected payo¤ of player C,
however, is higher in the "2-1" contest.
42The rst order condition for i 2 fA;Bg is (@pAB=@xi) (V=2) = 1, where the left hand side only depends
on (xA + xB). Hence, for players A and B, the "2-1" contest has multiple equilibria that di¤er in the
individual payo¤ of the alliance players. Joint (and average) alliance e¤ort, however, is identical in all
equilibria.
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A.2 E¤ort of stand-alone players in "2-1" contests
Dependent variable: individual e¤ort xCt of single player C
in the "2-1" contest (alliance AB vs. player C)
Indep. var.
xtreg
(1)
xtreg
(2)
xtreg
(3)
xtreg
(4)
Constant 160.7*** 150.4*** 150.2*** 150.9***
(16.12) (16.75) (16.81) (16.74)
CHOICE 13.0*** 13.0*** 13.0*** 21.4**
(=1 if CHOICE treatment) (4.74) (4.73) (4.73) (6.38)
C-NC -15.2 -15.3 -15.0 -15.3
(=1 if CHOICE rst) (18.10) (14.87) (14.93) (14.86)
PAY2-1 -20.1 -10.9 -11.1 -11.9
(=1 if fee for "2-1") (18.08) (15.03) (15.09) (15.03)
(xi xC)1 1 1NC 0.61*** 0.58*** 0.61***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
(xi xC)1 1 1NC CHOICE 0.06
(0.07)
I(vA;t;vB;t)=(1;1)CHOICE -14.2*
(7.26)
Socioeconomics NO YES YES YES
Observations 895 895 895 895
R2 0.0226 0.2702 0.2709 0.2691
Note: Random-e¤ects regression (77 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signicant at
the 1 percent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior).
"CHOICE" indicates whether the observation stems from a contest against a voluntarily formed alliance;
"C-NC" and "PAY2-1" are control variables for the di¤erent session types; (xi xC)1 1 1NC is an individuals
average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to average e¤ort of all players
C in these contests. The dummy variable I(vA;t;vB;t)=(1;1) indicates whether both alliance players had voted
for alliance formation. Observations from "NO CHOICE rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group.
Table A.1: Stand-alone playerse¤ort in the "2-1" contest.
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A.3 E¤ort in "1-1-1" contests conditional on the choice of alliance
formation
Average e¤ort xi, i=A;B in "1-1-1" contests conditional on
the decisions on alliance formation in the respective round
E¤ort #obs.
NO CHOICE (overall for i=A,B)
136.0
(6.51)
616
CHOICE (overall for i=A,B)
155.6
(6.78)
674
- xi if (vit; v it) = (0; 0) :
159.4
(9.34)
340
- xi if (vit; v it) = (0; 1) :
189.0
(8.75)
167
- xi if (vit; v it) = (1; 0) :
114.6
(8.30)
167
Note: Calculated is the average e¤ort of players i = A;B conditional on the own decision vit and the co-
players decision v it on whether to vote for alliance formation (vit=0 if, in round t, i voted for the "1-1-1"
contest). Observations from rounds 6-15 only. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual
level).
Table A.2: Individual e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests conditional on the choices on alliance
formation.
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B Supplementary material
B.1 Session types
Order of the two treatments:
NO CHOICE rst CHOICE rst
Pay for "2-1"
6 independent observations
54 participants in total
6 independent obs.
57 participants in total
Pay for "1-1-1"
6 independent observations
54 participants in total
7 independent obs.
66 participants in total
Table B.1: Session specications and number of observations.
B.2 Alliance e¤ort in "2-1" contests depending on the order of
play
xA or xB in "2-1" Theory Part 1 Part 2 Average
NO CHOICE 25
55.4
(4.74)
48.8
(3.64)
51.9
(2.96)
CHOICE 25
65.8
(4.96)
59.3
(6.13)
62.9
(3.86)
(CHOICE NO CHOICE) 0 10.3 10.5 11.0
Note: Observations from rounds 6-15 in each part only. The cells on the diagonal belong to the same session
type ("No-Choice/Part 1" and "Choice/Part 2", for instance, belong to the "No Choice rst" sessions).
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
Table B.2: Average e¤ort of alliance players in the "2-1" contest.
This table summarizes average e¤ort of alliance players in "2-1" contests, depending on
the order in which the two treatments NO CHOICE and CHOICE were played. For obser-
vations from part 1 (that is, comparing treatments that were played rst in the respective
session), e¤ort in CHOICE (if played rst) is on average 10:3 points higher than in NO
CHOICE (if played rst). Looking only at observations from part 2, e¤orts in CHOICE (if
played second) are on average 10:5 points higher than in NO CHOICE (if played second).
Finally, in both treatments, average e¤orts are consistently around 6:5 points lower in part
2 than in part 1, due to learning e¤ects.
B.1
B.3 Distribution of alliance e¤ort in "2-1" contests
Figure B.3: Distribution of alliance e¤ort in NO CHOICE and CHOICE.
Figure B.3 illustrates the cumulative distributions of e¤ort by alliance players A or B in
the "2-1" contest, comparing the CHOICE to the NO CHOICE treatment. (For the purpose
of illustration, the domain of the functions is restricted to xi 2 [0; 225]; a few outliers are
dropped.)
B.2
B.4 E¤ort of players A and B in "1-1-1" contests
CHOICE (Player A or B)
NO CHOICE (Player A or B)
Theory prediction (Player A or B)
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Figure B.4: Individual e¤ort (of players A or B) in "1-1-1" contests.
B.3
B.5 Experimental instructions1
Welcome! Please read these instructions carefully and completely. Properly understanding them
will help you to make better decisions and, hence, to earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Tokens. At the end of the experiment we
will convert the Tokens you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Tokens you
earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. In addition to the Tokens earned during the experiment, each
participant will receive a show-up-fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during
the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory without
getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and we will help you.
1. Your task Before beginning this experiment you will answer a quiz on your computer screen.
It contains questions regarding situations which might occur during the experiment. Consulting
these instructions will help you to answer them.
The experiment consists of three parts. These parts are independent from each other; your
decisions in one part have no inuence on the other parts.
For the experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. The experiment will be
repeated several times. The participants in your group will usually vary each period, since the
groups are randomly composed in each period.
Your task in each period is to make an e¤ort decision. The money you earn depends on your
decision and the decisions of the other players in your group. Let the three players in one group
be called A, B and C. In each period, three players A, B and C compete for a prize of 450 Tokens.
The competition works through two options. These are called Singleand Alliance.
You will play both options during this experiment.
Following the quiz you will be able to try out both options in a trial period. The monitor will
show you in each period which option is at hand.
The rules of both options are as follows:
Option Single: The computer designates each player his role (A, B or C). All players will
simultaneously choose their respective e¤ort in Tokens. The e¤ort a¤ects the probability of winning
the prize. Every player can choose any number of Tokens as e¤ort. Tokens are not divisible, so you
can only choose whole numbers, such as 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
You will have to pay this amount of Tokens to the lab, whether or not you win the competition.
1This section contains a translation of the set of instructions for the 2-PAY sessions where NO CHOICE
was played rst and CHOICE was played second. The instructions for the rst part (here: NO CHOICE )
were handed out in paper-form, and the instructions for the second part (here: CHOICE ) were shown on
screen after completion of the rst part.
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When all players have chosen their e¤orts, a fortune wheel will decide who will win the prize of
450 Tokens. The fortune wheel is divided into three colors: blue, green and purple. Blue represents
the Tokens A has bet. Green represents the amount B has chosen, and purple Cs amount.
The fractions of the colors on the fortune wheel correspond exactly to the proportion of the
respective e¤orts to the total e¤ort of all three players together.
All e¤orts of your group, and therefore the probability of each player to win the prize, will be
presented to you for your information.
At the center of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the top. After some
time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly. If the arrow stops in the blue-colored
area, player A wins. If the arrow stops in the green-colored area, player B wins the prize; If the
arrow stops in the purple-colored area, player C wins the prize.
This means that the probability that player A, B or C wins the prize is equal to his corresponding
share of the e¤ort in the total expense, hence
Probability that player A wins = e¤ort of player Atotal expense of A, B and C together .
Analogous formulas apply for players B and C.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his own expenditure in the
competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group.
Note that the more Tokens a player spends, the more likely it is that he wins the competition.
More e¤ort expended, however, also means that a player has to pay more Tokens to the lab.
If none of the players expend any Tokens, then it is equally likely (probability of 1/3rd) that
A, or B or C wins.
As soon as at least one Token is bet, the above given formula for the probability of winning
holds. If two players do not expend any Tokens, but the third player (e.g. B) expends at least one
Token, the third player (i.e. B) wins the competition.
Every player has to pay his e¤ort (in Tokens) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the
fortune wheel.
Therefore, your earnings per period will be calculated as your prize in the competition minus
your e¤ort: earnings = prize - e¤ort.
The winning player gets the prize of 450 Token and the losing players get nothing. The winning
players earnings = 450 own e¤ort, while the losing players have to pay their e¤orts to the lab
and dont get any winnings.
Note: Should you bet more Tokens in a period than you can actually win, you will certainly
make a loss.
The payment will only take place at the end of the entire experiment.
Option Alliance: The two players A and B form an alliance. Player C is playing on his
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own.
Your role in the experiment, either A, B or C, will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant
will keep his role throughout the entire experiment.
All players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort (whole number), which they would like to bet.
Each player decides independently on his e¤ort. A players e¤ort can be any number of Tokens,
which he will have to pay to the lab whether or not he wins the competition.
Players A and B have to pay 5 Tokens for every period they play in an Alliance.
After the individual decisions have been made, a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether
the alliance consisting of players A and B or player C wins the 450-Token-prize. As you will see,
the fortune wheel is divided into two colors turquoise and purple. The turquoise color represents
the total Tokens spent by players A and B. The purple color represents the Tokens spent by player
C.
For your information, you will be shown the amount of Tokens that the other players in your
group have expended as well as the respective probabilities of A and B, or C of winning the prize.
If the arrow stops in the turquoise-colored area, players A and B win the prize. If the arrow
stops in the purple-colored area, player C wins the prize.
Probability that players A and B win the contest= e¤ort of A and Bsum of e¤orts of A,B and C .
Probability that player C wins the contest= e¤ort of player Csum of e¤orts of A,B and C .
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his own expenditure in the
competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group.
If none of the players expend any Tokens then it is equally likely that the alliance consisting of
players A and B or that player C wins.
As soon as at least one Token is bet, the above given formulas for the probability of winning
hold.
Every player has to pay his e¤ort (in Tokens) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the for-
tune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per period will be calculated as your prize in the competition
minus your e¤ort: earnings = prize - e¤ort.
If the alliance of A and B wins, each player receives only half of the prize. Their respective
earnings are: 225 - 5 - own e¤ort. Player C does not win anything but has to pay his e¤ort.
If C wins, his earnings are his prize of 450 minus his own e¤ort. Players A and B dont receive
any earnings but have to each pay their respective e¤ort plus 5 Tokens.
Note: Should you bet more Tokens in a period than you can actually win, you will certainly
make a loss.
The payment will only take place at the end of the entire experiment.
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2. Procedure The experiment will consist of 15 periods. In each period, you will have the same
role (player A, B or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in
each period.
Player C always plays alone. Players A and B either play alone or in an alliance, depending on
the game option (Single or Alliance). The two players in your group will be randomly assigned to
you in each period. You will not know who the other players in your group are. Any attempt to
reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly choose 3 periods out of 15; your total
earnings in those 3 periods will be added up, converted to Euros and paid to you in cash. This
means that the earnings of all other 12 periods will not be paid to you and that you do not have
to pay your e¤orts from those periods either. You will get to know which 3 out of the 15 periods
will be chosen only at the end of this experiment. In addition, you will receive 0.60 Euros for each
of the 15 periods.
You will receive information about the second and third parts of the experiment on your screen.
After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some questions, including some personal infor-
mation (e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and
strictly condential.
We will begin now with the quiz, after which you will have the opportunity to try playing one
Single and one Alliance game. We would like to thank you in advance for participating and wish
you good luck!
*************************
Part 22 This part will consist of 15 periods.
In each period, players A and B will vote on whether they would like to play option Single or
option Alliance.
 If player A and player B both choose Single, option Single will be played.
 If player A and player B both choose Alliance, option Alliance will be played.
 If each option receives one vote, there will be a random draw. The options are then chosen
with equal probability.
2The instructions for the second part were displayed on the screen. This sample is for the sessions where
the small fee was applied to the "2-1" contest and where NO CHOICE was played rst. Hence, Part 2 refers
to the CHOICE treatment.
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At all times, the screen will keep you informed about which option was picked for the period
you are in.
 If option Alliance is realized, player A and player B will each have to pay 5 additional tokens
to the laboratory. Player C does not have to pay any additional tokens.
 If option Single is realized, no additional payment from anyone is incurred.
All other rules, as described in the instructions, remain in place.
Three out of the following 15 periods will be chosen for payment. In addition, you will receive
0.60 Euros for every period in this part.
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